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Lessons Learned in Timor-Leste 
 
Damien Kingsbury 
 
A little more than 10 years after the people of what is now Timor-Leste voted for 
independence, this small, half-island country has compressed into a few short years what 
many other post-colonial states have taken decades to achieve. It has been largely destroyed, 
achieved independence, had a political crisis, transitioned to democracy, and now appears to 
be heading into a period of political calm and economic growth. After the near-catastrophic 
events of 2006, Timor-Leste’s prospects are looking relatively positive, even if a number of 
important caveats apply. 
 
After roughly 300 years of Portuguese colonial neglect came to an end in December 1975, 
what was then known as Portuguese Timor was invaded by neighboring Indonesia. The 
territory became a war zone: More than a quarter of the population was killed or died as a 
result of the subsequent occupation (which was never recognized under international law), 
and the rest was deeply traumatized. 
 
Twenty-three years later, when Indonesia’s Suharto was pushed from office in 1998, Jakarta 
was in the midst of a financial crisis. The cost of the occupation of Timor Leste, both 
financially and in terms of its continuing damage to Indonesia’s international reputation, 
alienated the new president, B. J. Habibie, and his technocratic peers, and interfered with his 
attempts to oversee Indonesia’s political reform. Faced with increasing calls for some sort of 
long-term political transition towards self-determination, Habibie unexpectedly announced 
that Timor-Leste could vote on whether it wished to be independent or an “autonomous” 
province within Indonesia. 
 
In an attempt to ensure that Timor-Leste remained part of Indonesia, the Indonesian military 
(TNI) established pro-integration militias and embarked on a campaign of intimidation and 
terror. The campaign failed, and in a U.N.-supervised ballot on Aug. 30, 1999, 78.5 percent 
of registered East Timorese voters chose independence. In response, the TNI and its proxy 
militias went on a rampage, murdering at least 1,400 people and burning around 70 percent of 
the country’s infrastructure. International negotiations resulted in an Australian-led 
multinational military force, INTERFET, entering Timor-Leste. INTERFET brought an end 
to the destruction and violence, the withdrawal of Indonesian forces, and the return of the 
U.N. But in the aftermath of the violence, Timor-Leste was left with virtually no 
infrastructure and a deeply traumatized, poorly educated and largely unskilled population. 
 
In the lead-up to the ballot, popular expectations of independence were high. The post-ballot 
reality, however, was not only that independence had not delivered a significantly better 
outcome, but that living conditions actually declined. Meanwhile, the U.N., tasked with 
building a country from the ground up, ran the territory as a fiefdom. 
 
Despite its many competencies, the U.N. was not especially well-suited to the job of nation-
building. Many of its officials were poorly trained, incompetent or just did not care. Rather 
than imparting skills and building capacity, U.N. officials often found it easier just to do the 
job themselves, leaving untrained Timorese to watch. 
 
It did not take long before bitterness over this new reality, desperate competition for reduced 
resources, and political opportunism led to a push for formalizing independence, even if it 
meant what then looked to be an early international withdrawal. A new constitution was 
drawn up, in which the parliament would be the executive body of state, with the president 
occupying a largely ceremonial position. In part, the move to have a ceremonial president 
was intended to avoid the personal excesses of other executive presidencies, not least that of 
Indondesia. But the largest party, Fretilin, also wished to hobble presidential aspirant Xanana 
Gusmao, who had been at odds with Fretilin’s political leader, Mari Alkatiri. 
 
Independence was formally declared in 2002, with Fretilin, led by a group who had spent 
their exile overseas, taking two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Gusmao became Timor-
Leste’s first president, and Alkatiri was appointed prime minister. 
 
Timor-Leste was at this time one of the poorest, most disadvantaged countries in the world. 
The new government was faced with running a country still only partially built, reliant on 
foreign aid and with a population both poorly trained and increasingly desperate. In the face 
of such circumstances, and with old rivalries resurfacing as the unity of the independence 
struggle faded into memory, East Timorese divided along political and ethnic faultlines that 
led to challenges to government authority. Serious rioting in 2003 and 2004 led to heavy-
handed police responses, making clear that the decision to only partially retrain the police, 
many of whom had served under the Indonesian occupation, was an error. 
 
As “liberators of the people,” former guerrilla armies often continue to see themselves as the 
guardians of the state, rather than as its servants. This has led to the active involvement of 
newly independent militaries in the politics of many developing countries. Similarly, the 
politics of post-colonial states can continue to be informed by the methods and networks of 
the resistance period, including top-down decision making, black market sources of income, a 
lack of procedural consistency or transparency, and, sometimes, recourse to intimidation and 
violence. All of these qualities pervaded Timor-Leste’s initial years of independence. 
 
The question was also raised whether the creation of the Falintil-Timor-Leste Defence Force 
(F-FDTL) was just a sop to ex-combatants from the independence struggle. At around 1,500 
troops, the army was too small to be an effective defensive force, a role that was in any case 
guaranteed by the international community, yet it consumed 8 percent of the budget. Its 
potential for becoming politically involved, too, worried many. 
 
More positively, income from Timor Gap oil and gas resources began to accumulate in a U.S. 
Treasury bonds-based “oil fund.” Yet Timor-Leste’s economic problems involved not just 
having enough funds, but also in developing the capacity to adequately spend them. At one 
level, a high degree of bureaucratic centralization meant that funds were slow to be 
distributed, especially beyond Dili. This level of centralized control was intended to limit 
corruption, which was already problematic. But it also meant that financial liquidity in the 
districts was in desperately short supply. 
 
In response to growing public disenchantment, the government became increasingly 
uncommunicative, brittle and tending towards authoritarian. Divisions opened up with the 
Catholic Church over education policy, the poorly trained police became notorious for 
corruption and brutality, and the F-FDTL became divided -- between older members and 
newer recruits, ex-guerrillas and the formerly Indonesian police, as well as along geographic 
and ethnic lines. Citing discrimination, newer army recruits constituting about a third of the 
army staged a protest in Dili on April 28, 2006. The protest was joined by other anti-
government groups and quickly grew out of control, resulting in widespread rioting. The 
prime minister called in the rest of the army, and five people were shot dead, with many more 
wounded. 
 
Thereafter, the state began its descent into chaos. Soldiers attacked the police, killing 11 
officers even after they had surrendered. A small group of dissident soldiers went into the 
hills, attacking “loyal” forces that chased after them. Gangs that were organized around the 
martial arts, as well as others with links to political elites, attacked both each other and East 
Timorese from what were perceived to be competing language groups. This linguistic 
cleavage was quickly defined as a conflict of “East” versus “West,” and although such an 
oversimplification was inaccurate, its currency quickly defined reality. 
 
As the police force disintegrated and civil violence became widespread, the Fretilin 
government called in international support in the form of the International Stabilisation Force 
(ISF) -- comprised of Australian and New Zealand soldiers and Portuguese and Malaysian 
paramilitary police -- and the renewed intervention of the U.N. and its police contingent. The 
worst of the violence was contained within weeks, although sporadic outbursts continued 
until the end of the following year. 
 
As a result of the violence, more than three-dozen people were killed, and around 160,000 
people -- who were either displaced from or lost their homes -- quickly settled into internally 
displaced persons camps in and near Dili. A gang of soldiers led by Alfredo Reinado 
retreated into the hills, while other dissident soldiers set up camp near Ermera, to the 
southwest of Dili. At an elite political level, under intense pressure, Alkatiri resigned as 
prime minister. Gusmao installed José Ramos-Horta as interim prime minister until the 
scheduled 2007 elections. 
 
The violence and destruction of 2006 had many impacts, not least of which was to shock and 
further dismay a still-traumatized people. Violence in Timor-Leste, however, had become 
acculturated, and in some respects domesticated. But the belief that a traumatized and still 
poorly trained people and government could stand alone was shown to be wanting: It became 
clear that it was not possible to establish, much less embed, the institutions of state in a few 
short years, and that limited resources, patronage and corruption were an explosive mix. 
Timor-Leste reflected problems common to many developing countries -- including 
desperation, brittle control, institutional breakdown and government failure -- and almost 
became a failed state. 
 
Ahead of the 2007 elections, Gusmao established a new party, the Congress for Timorese 
National Reconstruction, whose initials, CNRT, played on the Council for Timorese National 
Resistance, which had been the coalition of all parties under which Timor-Leste won 
independence. The CNRT drew from other parties, but especially from disaffected members 
of Fretilin, many of whom resented the dominance within the party by those who had spent 
the occupation in exile. The initial voting for the presidency in 2007 demonstrated the erosion 
of Fretilin’s popular support. The party achieved the largest plurality among a crowded field 
in first-round voting, but at roughly 30 percent, its tally amounted to half that of the previous 
election in 2001. In the second-round run-off, the non-Fretilin vote went entirely to Ramos-
Horta, who won with around 70 percent. 
 
The election period was tense, with some sporadic violence. However, a relatively high 
international and military presence allowed the subsequent parliamentary elections to proceed 
more or less unhindered. Fretilin again won just under 30 percent of the vote, achieving the 
largest plurality and quickly demanding to be allowed to form a government on that basis. 
However, Gusmao put together a majority coalition of minor parties, which the new 
president, Ramos-Horta, appointed to govern, with Gusmao as prime minister. 
 
Fretilin refused to accept this outcome, saying that the constitution gave the largest vote-
getter the opportunity to form the government. Its militants immediately went on a rampage, 
burning houses and killing a small number of people. However, the constitution includes a 
clause allowing for a majority coalition government. Given that such a majority coalition was 
available, this outcome was consistent with democratic principle. Reflecting its coalition 
status, the government became known as the Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP). 
 
In the face of continuing pro-Fretilin protests, the AMP government began initiating reforms. 
Key among them was to make foreign investment easier, to reduce and simplify the tax code 
and, as its tenure progressed, to increase government spending. It was, Gusmao said, 
important to save for the future, but not at the expense of being unable to live in the present. 
 
The political situation, however, remained volatile, with Reinado and his gang playing “cat 
and mouse” with the ISF, dissident soldiers only slowly moving into a cantonment from 
where they could negotiate their grievances, and the IDP camps becoming the site of political 
unrest. Then, at dawn on the morning of Feb. 11, 2008, Reinado snapped. Sensing, correctly, 
that the government’s initial negotiations with the dissident soldiers might ultimately leave 
him isolated, Reinado and his gang split into two groups, one targeting President Ramos-
Horta for assassination, and the other targeting Prime Minister Gusmao. 
 
In the ensuing attacks, Reinado himself and one of his followers were shot dead. Ramos-
Horta was shot and critically wounded. Gusmao escaped uninjured. 
 
Ramos-Horta was evacuated first to an Australian military hospital and then to Darwin, 
Australia, for life-saving surgery. The event sent a shockwave through Timor-Leste and the 
international community. Yet rather than heralding further state failure, the violence shocked 
many East Timorese into revising their divided perspectives. Reinado’s death also left the 
more belligerent anti-Fretilin groups without the galvanizing figure of a romanticized outlaw 
hero. 
 
The rest of Reinado’s gang was quickly captured or surrendered, and the dissident soldiers, 
now isolated, agreed to a deal with the government in which they would receive $8,000 in 
exchange for resigning from the army. With the security environment increasingly settled, the 
government was then able to clear the IDP camps, assisted by payments of around $5,000 per 
family to help them rebuild their lost homes. Further, the AMP government purchased large 
stocks of rice, both for subsequent warehousing and distribution at subsidized prices, in order 
to alleviate a shortage caused by price increases. The effort was enhanced by the end of a 
long-running drought, allowing local crops to again return to surplus. The injection of 
liquidity boosted the economy, and in an environment in which such largesse could have 
seriously depleted the government’s coffers, an unexpected financial windfall from rising oil 
revenues assisted the extra spending. 
 
However, the decision to tap into the oil reserve fund was controversial. Fretilin attacked the 
government for abandoning the previous policy of only using the interest from the fund for 
government spending. There were also concerns about the potential impact of the so-called 
“resource curse,” where an economy, buoyed by resource income, inflates the value of its 
currency, thereby damaging non-resource export capacity, often with implications for 
employment. The windfall profits also often fuel corruption. 
 
While Timor-Leste’s only export industries were hydrocarbons and coffee, its currency was 
the U.S. dollar. Meanwhile, unemployment was more determined by subsistence farmers 
moving to towns in search of paid work, limiting the potential for that component of the 
“curse.” However, there were numerous allegations about corruption and nepotism, most of 
which were not well-substantiated at the higher levels of government, but which appeared to 
have considerable validity elsewhere. To counter this, the government launched an anti-
corruption drive, with limited success. 
 
To further increase liquidity among the wider community, and in part to buy off potential 
disaffection, the government also made payments to resistance veterans. This was later 
supplemented by a small pension for people over the age of 60, as the average life expectancy 
had improved to just over 60 years of age, up from the mid-50s just a few years before. 
 
But more importantly, the government moved to decentralize the state, reconstituting each of 
its 13 districts as a municipality with an elected council and an executive mayor. Each of the 
districts would have control over spending for a range of areas outside those retained by the 
central government, with funding to be distributed on a per-capita basis. The purpose of this 
decentralization was to give local people greater control over their lives, and to ensure that 
capital was adequately distributed outside Dili. 
 
For the 2008-9 financial year, Timor-Leste recorded 13 percent economic growth, if off of a 
very low base and almost entirely dependent on government spending. Inflation had fallen to 
around 6 percent, down from highs in the low teens only a few years previously. More 
ominously, though, the country’s fertility rate had exploded, with eight live births per female, 
making it the most fertile country in the world. This not only seriously unbalanced the 
population, so that about half of Timor-Leste was under the age of 16, but led to population 
growth that could not be sustained by the productive capacity of the increasingly distressed 
natural environment. Despite progressive government policies, deforestation continued and 
potable water supplies remained inadequate. Furthermore, in order to provide electricity for 
the whole country, the government opted for two heavy oil generators that were not only 
environmentally unfriendly, but would be increasingly expensive to run. 
 
Timor-Leste’s foreign relations were also tested, especially by Australia and Indonesia. As 
the main source of imports, Indonesia had considerable capacity to influence Timor-Leste’s 
internal affairs. As an example, in August 2009, when Indonesia’s foreign minister refused to 
leave the airport to attend the 10th anniversary of the ballot on independence unless an 
arrested militia leader was released, Prime Minister Gusmao complied, in breach of his 
country’s own laws. The release called further attention to how, in order to appease its large 
neighbor, Timor-Leste had not pursued various charges resulting from Indonesia’s brutal 
occupation and bloody departure in 1999. 
 
As is often the case, many of Timor-Leste’s problems following independence were common 
to post-colonial states, while some remained specific to Timor-Leste. Among the former is 
the challenge, sometimes contentious, of combining separate language groups within a single 
administrative entity. Although Portuguese and Tetum are Timor-Leste’s official national 
languages, English and Indonesian are widely used “working” languages, with more than two 
dozen other languages and dialects also in use. About 70 percent of the population speaks one 
of the four dialects of Tetum, and 80 percent speak Indonesian. Portuguese is spoken by less 
than 15 percent of the population, and English is the popularly preferred third language. Since 
state documents and court hearings are written and conducted in Portuguese, they are 
inaccessible to most East Timorese. It is common for new states to develop a state language, 
and it seems that Tetum might become that. Tetum is the spoken language in the parliament, 
and there is an increasing tendency to publish in Tetum. However, while this process is 
underway, Timor-Leste faces, at best, linguistic confusion. 
 
On the other hand, Timor-Leste was lucky compared with many newly independent 
countries, in having a relatively large oil and natural gas supply within its territorial 
boundaries. If managed carefully, this could underpin development for decades. However, if 
mismanaged, Timor Leste, like others before it, could experience the “resource curse” of 
increased corruption, rent-seeking behavior, an artificially inflated economy and an inevitable 
economic slump. 
 
In the short term, however, much of this wealth is being used to ease some of the burden of 
poverty that characterized Timor-Leste, and hence to ease pressures that many developing 
states face before they manage to consolidate state institutions. In this, Timor-Leste has 
bought itself some time. 
 
As 2009 progresses into 2010, there are increasing signs of East Timorese wanting to again 
take control of their own affairs. At one level, a push for greater local control is to be 
expected for an independent state managing to put its brush with civil conflict and potential 
state failure behind it. At another level, however, is the possibility that moving too quickly 
towards such decentralized control could result in a repetition of the failures that led to the 
crisis of 2006, in turn implying a cycle of failure all too common to developing countries. 
 
However, economic growth and redistribution augured well, as did the general policy settings 
of both the government and the opposition. And importantly, the commitment to electoral 
politics by the people of Timor-Leste showed that democracy did not require a long history 
for it to embed itself among the country’s citizens. That, in turn, provided a managed way in 
which to order and resolve competing interests. 
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Support ETAN in 2010! Go to http://etan.org/etan/donate.htm to donate. Thank you. 
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